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[157] 
Death in the Shadows 
 
 
DR. MARY CAMPBELL AND LUCILLE JEWEL 
 
This paper is about the law and visual culture. Its centerpiece is Parson 
Weems’ Fable (1939) (fig.1), a painting by the American artist Grant Wood 
(1891-1942) that depicts the apocryphal story of George Washington and 
the cherry tree.  At first glance, Wood’s image appears to celebrate an 
enduring myth of American virtue, namely Washington’s precocious 
inability to tell a lie.  Studying the picture more closely, however, one finds 
a pair of black figures, presumably two of the Washingtons’ slaves.  
Stationed beneath dark storm clouds and harvesting cherries from a second 
tree, these slaves invoke yet another national myth, that of the domestic 
serenity that supposedly reigned on Virginia’s colonial plantations.  In the 
process, they quietly invoke the country’s grievous history of racial 
oppression, coercion, and brutality.  
This isn’t the only place where Woods’ painting speaks of racial 
violence.  To the contrary, Parson Weems’ Fable also raises the specter of 
lynching.  Examining the shadows directly beneath the Washingtons and their 
fabled tree, one discovers a hanging black body.  Intentional or not, this 
dangling corpse conjures the spectacular acts of theatrical violence that 
mobs of Euro-Americans inflicted on African Americans during the late 
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth.  By the 1930s, heated protests 
emerged against lynching—in popular songs, magazines, and art exhibitions, 
as well as more traditional political arenas.  Unlike the painters most closely 
associated with him, Wood didn’t participate directly in such moments of 
artistic protest.  Nonetheless, he would have been exposed to them as he 
painted Parson Weems’ Fable in the winter of 1939. 
Regardless of Wood’s intentions, the work he created persistently 
connects the country’s origin myths to the murderous violence the U.S. has 
repeatedly inflicted on persons of color.  Moreover, as the painting itself 
seems to realize, the law and culture forged by colonial Virginia planters like 
George Washington eventually morphed into a collective white psychopathy 
that found vicious expression in the practice of spectacle lynching.  This 
colonial legal regime was deeply visual—a fact that accounts for not only its 
power, but also for the fundamental influence it continues to exert on current 
American conceptions of race. 
A deep reading of Parson Weems’ Fable in the context of both its time 
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(1939) and its setting (1736) reveals the extent to which the law is visual and 
the visual is legal.  Indeed, the painting gives us a valuable lens for 
perceiving the pervasive connections that run between the two.  Our thesis 
is that the profoundly visuo-legal nature of the country’s racial foundations 
helps explain the lack of progress the nation has made in dismantling the 
color line.  As a result, the impulse to join the seemingly unrelated 
disciplines of legal study and art history isn’t an academic gimmick, but 
rather a necessity.  For centuries, images have worked in tandem with 
statutes, judicial decisions, and various forms of legal (and illegal) 
punishment to indelibly imprint a logic of racial violence in our collective 
mindset.  In order to fully excavate this logic, we need scholars who can 
analyze pictures as well as the law. 
In terms of structure, we begin by introducing the painting and our 
analytical framework and method.  After that, we explain the theoretical 
foundations for studying law and culture in this context. Finally, we connect 
colonial Virginia’s legal and cultural landscape to the traumatic racial 
violence that continues to haunt our national mythology. 
 
 




“Grant Wood paints George Washington & the C herry Tree,” Life 
magazine announced on February 19, 1940, heralding a new work by the 
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famed creator of American Gothic (1930).1  As the magazine eagerly 
reported, this latest Wood painting, Parson Weems’ Fable (1939), depicted a 
key episode in the first president’s illustrious existence.  “The crucial moment 
when Washington Sr. discovers the mutilated cherry tree is shown here at the 
left [of the image].  Hatchet in hand, l ittle George is making his immortal 
confession: ‘I can’t tell a lie, Pa; I did c ut it with my hatchet.”2  Wearing a 
pair of bright blue tights and, even more incongruously, the face of Gilbert 
Stuart’s famed portrait of Washington at age sixty -four, the future leader of  
the Republic perform s his legendary act of self-incrim ination while two 
African slaves harvest a second, intact tree in the background. 
Interestingly, a fifth figure  stands at the far right of t he picture, lifting 
the heavy scarlet curtain that frames the scene and pointing at the Washington 
drama unfolding center stage.  As the painting’s title  tells us, this is Parson 
Mason Locke Weems (1759-1 825).  An Episcopalian minister, traveling 
book seller, and author in his own right,3 Weems dreamed up the cherry tree 
incident for the 1806 edition of his popular biography The Life of George 
Washington.4  Although generations of Americans would go on t o accept 
Weems’ story as historical fact, it was, in actuality, pure fiction.  As Wood’s 
painting literally foregrounds, the c ountry’s canonical account of  its pater 
patriae’s inability to dissemble was itself something of a lie.5 
“It didn’t seem right to separate We ems from the story  he invented,” 
Wood explained to a reporter shortly after completing the work.6  Right or 
not, his decision to call att ention to the apocryphal nature of Washington’s 
escapades in arboreal honesty sat poorly with a national audience that had 
come to embrace Wood as a downhome practitioner of so-called “real” 
American art7—the sort of painter who would publicly declare, “all the really 
 
1.  Parson Weems’ Fable, LIFE, Feb. 19, 1940, at 33. 
2.  Id.   
3.  Steven Biel, Parson Weems Fights Fascists, COMMON-PLACE (July 2006), http://www. 
common-place-archives.org/vol-06/no-04/biel/. 
4.  MASON LOCKE WEEMS, THE LIFE OF WASHINGTON A NEW EDITION WITH PRIMARY 
DOCUMENTS AND INTRODUCTION 9-10 (Peter Onuf ed., 1996).  On the fictional nature of the cherry 
tree story, see Shirley Reece-Hughes, Moments of Discovery in Grant Wood’s Theatrical Paintings, 
in BARBARA HASKELL, GRANT WOOD: AMERICAN GOTHIC AND OTHER FABLES 55 (Yale Univ. 
Press 2018) (“Weems draws back a stage curtain [in Wood’s painting] as he points to his apocryphal 
tale of Washington at the cherry tree”); R. TRIPP EVANS, GRANT WOOD: A LIFE 266 (1st ed. 2010) 
(“Weems’s story has long been dismissed by serious historians”).   
5.  See WANDA M. CORN, GRANT WOOD: THE REGIONALIST VISION 120 (1983) (“Mason 
Locke Weems, the late-eighteenth-century Anglican clergyman who fabricated an apocryphal tale 
about George Washington and the cherry tree”). 
6.  Grant Wood Tells Story of Latest Work, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN, Jan. 6, 1940, at 12. 
7.  Maynard Walker, Mid-West is Producing an Indigenous Art, 7 ART DIGEST 7, 10 (Sept. 1, 
1933) (quoted by Barbara Haskell, Grant Wood: Through the Past, Darkly, in BARBARA HASKELL, 
GRANT WOOD: AMERICAN GOTHIC AND OTHER FABLES 26 (Yale Univ. Press 2018) [hereinafter 
Haskell, Grant Wood, Through the Past, Darkly]. 
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good ideas I’[ve] ever had [have] come to me while I was milking a cow”8 
while publicly rejecting the sophisticated influence of the European and New 
York art elite.9  Gertrude Stein might have delighted in Wood’s satirical side, 
christening him “the all-ti me menace.”10  In general, however, 193 0s 
Americans lauded Woo d and his fellow Regionalist painters as the 
champions of “a dem ocratic, populist a rt that could be understood by the 
masses.”11  As Wood him self put it, “a work which does not make contact 
with the public is lost.”12 
As Wood quickly discovered, Parson Weems Fable largely made the 
wrong sort of contact with its public in the winter of 1939 and 1940. 
Even as the painting debuted at the Whitney Museum’s prestigious 
biennial exhibition—selling for $10,000 only a day after Wood shipped it 
from his stu dio in Iowa to his gallery in Manhattan 13—the work’s frank 
acknowledgement that Weems, himself, played a central role in the cherry  
tree tale sparked nothing short of a sca ndal.  Not only  did Wood receive a 
flood of angry letters and telegrams accusing him of staging “a ‘debunking’ 
crusade against Washington,”14 newspapers throughout the nation castigated 
him for his treat ment of American history.  “Unfortunately, there are ultra-
sophisticates in this world who believe the cradle is the place to rob childhood 
of its fondest fancies.  Wh at’s going to become of our faith in heroes when  
all of our cherished stories have been debunked,” the Philadelphia Inquirer 
demanded in an article entitled “Debunke rs Can’t Chop Stor y of Cherry 
Tree.”15  “So the Washington-cherry tree deal i s a myth, eh? . . . Maybe 
Washington was not president of these United States.  None of us can be 
sure,” an irate letter to the editor of the  Des Moines Register sniped.16  As 
 
8.  Jean Kinney, Grant Wood: He Got His Best Ideas While Milking a Cow, N.Y. TIMES (June 
2, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/02/archives/grantwood-he-got-his-best-ideas-while-
milking-a-cow-grant-wood-he.html. 
9.  See, e.g., Grant Wood, Revolt Against the City, in 1 WHIRLING WORLD SERIES 131 (Frank 
Luther Mott ed., 1935) (“The great central areas of America are coning to be evaluated more and 
more justly as the years pass.  They are not a Hinterland for New York; they are not barbaric.”).   
10.  Gertrude Stein, quoted in EVANS, supra note 4, at 156. 
11.  Haskell, Grant Wood: Through the Past, Darkly, supra note 7, at 25.   
12.  Karla Ann Marling, Of Cherry Trees and Ladies’ Teas: Grant Wood Look at Colonial 
America, in THE COLONIAL REVIVAL IN AM. 299 (Alan Axelrod, ed., 1985) (q uoting THIS IS 
GRANT WOOD COUNTRY 1 (Joan Liffring-Zug & John Zug, eds., in cooperation with Nana Wood 
Graham, Davenport Municipal Art Gallery, 1977)). 
13.  Mark Thistlewaite, Nationalism & Truth in Grand Wood’s Parson Weems’ Fable, in DE 
GRUYTER, PICTORIAL CULTURES & POL. ICONOGRAPHIES: APPROACHES, PERSP., CASE STUD. 
FROM EUR. & AM. 111 (Udo J. Hebel & Christoph Wagner, eds., 2011). 
14.  Cherry Tree Fantasy Explained Artist: Grant Wood Says He means No Offense in Painting 
of Washington and Hatchet, SAN BERNARDINO CTY SUN, Jan. 4, 1940, at 3. 
15.  Debunkers Can’t Chop Story of Cherry Tree, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 22, 1940, at 21. (“If 
Washington didn’t cut down the cherry tree who did use the hatchet?” the article continued, clearly 
undeterred by facts not in evidence.”)  
16.  Grant Wood Art Stirs Her Wrath, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 14, 1940, at 11.   
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Life’s own coverage of Parson Weems’ Fable noted, “Almost before the paint 
was dry on this picture it started a battle.”17 
According to Wood, he had “no intention of ‘debunking’” either 
Washington or Weems’ story with his painting.18  To the contrary, he insisted, 
he wanted to find a way to open up the power of America’s founding folklore 
to those who would otherwise view it with derisive skepticism.  The winter 
before he began work on the canvas, Wood had been deeply struck by an 
article he’d read in The Atlantic Monthly.  Written by  the lite rary critic 
Howard Mumford Jones  and entitled “Patriotism—But How?” the piece 
wrestled with the q uestion of how t o approach American history with  
sufficient self-consciousness to avoid virulent nationalism, but enough 
romance to sustain the country’ s spirits in a potential war for de mocracy.19  
Disturbed by the rise of fascism in  “dictator countries,”20 which fueled their 
populaces’ patriotism with “glamorous mythological images,”21 Jones 
concluded: “[t]he only way to conquer an alien mythology is to have a better 
mythology of your own.”22  Wood hoped his canvas might provide just this 
type of “realistic-minded, sophisticated” myth.23  “It is, of course, good that 
we are wiser today and recognize historical fact from historical fiction,” he 
explained in a public statement about Parson Weems’ Fable.  “Still, when we 
began to ridicule the story of George and the cherry tree and quit teaching it 
to our children, something of color and imagination departed from American 
life.  It is this something that I am interested in helping to preserve.”24 
As we’ll see, Wood’ s painting ultimately preserved something much 
darker than such chipper nods to natio nal flair.  “[A]  play within a play, a 
fable about the making of fables,”25 Parson Weems’ Fable quietly confesses 
to the acts of theatrical racial viol ence that frequently undergird America’s 
stories of national greatness.  The only image Wood ever created that depicts 
Africans or African Americans,26 the painting in vokes one of the nation’s 
ugliest racialized crimes: lynching.  Defined here as the ritualistic torture and 
murder of black indivi duals by white mobs,27 the majority of lynchings 
 
17.  Parson Weems’ Fable, LIFE, supra note 1, at 33 
18.  Artist Denies Intent to ‘Debunk’ Legend: ‘Clarifies’ Picture of Washington and the 
Cherry Tree, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1940, at 18. 
19.  Howard Mumford Jones, Patriotism—But How? 162 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, NOV. 1938, 
at 585, 585–92. 
20.  Id. at 585.  
21.  Id.  
22.  Jones, supra note 19, at 590.   
23.  Artist Denies Intent to ‘Debunk’ Legend: ‘Clarifies’ Picture of Washington and the 
Cherry Tree, supra note 18. 
24.  Id.   
25.  CORN, supra note 5, at 120.  
26.  EVANS, supra note 4, at 276.  
27.  See Shawn Michelle Smith, The Evidence of Lynching Photos, in LYNCHING 
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“occurred between 1880 and 19 30, primarily in the South.”28  During these 
years, Euro-Americans killed at least 4,697 African Americans in profoundly 
social, performative ways.29  Crowds of up to fifteen thousand white 
spectators gathered to watch as other whites torm ented and often mutilated 
their black victims before burning, shooting, dragging, or hanging them to 
death.30  “‘Lynch parties’ concluded wi th frenzied souvenir gather ing and 
display of dismembered parts”31 as members of the mob ripped bloody 
clothing, bones, and even genitalia from the massacred corpses.32  Crucially, 
lynchings were not simply eruptions of racial hatred.  Instead, they were one 
way in which “white southerners sought to restore their dominance in the face 
of emancipation and the  threat of black enfranchisement and social 
autonomy.”33  Designed to terrorize entire communities of blac k 
Americans,34 lynchings and the memorabilia they produced gave savagely 
spectacular form to the same racist ideologies that produced the  country’s 
 
PHOTOGRAPHS 15 (Dora Apel &  Shawn Michelle Smith eds., 2007) (“Lynching is defined as  
murder committed by a mob of three or more. In the United States, however, lynching has been 
practiced and understood primarily as a racialized and racist crime: the majority of lynching victims 
have been men and women of color, and the largest number of them have been women, and children, 
often unmasked, and sometimes numbering the thousands. ”); Amy Louis Wood, LYNCHING AND 
SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA,1890-1940 4 (2009) (“[T]he vast 
majority of lynchings at the turn of the cen tury took place in former slave states, and the  
overwhelming majority of those were perpetrated against black men.   Even more important here, 
most Americans at the turn of the century understood lynching as a southern practice and as a form 
of racial violence that white mobs committees against African American men.”).  But see, Evelyn 
M. Simien, Introduction, in GENDER AND LYNCHING: THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 3 (Evelyn M. 
Simien ed., 2011) (“The term ‘lynching’ evokes an image derived from a collective memory which 
African American men and women both share, but  to which only African American  men claim 
entitlement—i.e., a charred male f igure swinging from a tree or a tel egraph pole amidst an angry 
mob. Such an image has overshadowed the equally representative experience of African American 
women who were similarly tortured and mutilated, as well as raped and killed, by angry mobs.”). 
28.  Smith, supra note 27, at 15.   
29.  Smith, supra note 27, at 15.   
30.  See Dora Apel, Lynching Photographs and the Politics of Public Shaming, in LYNCHING 
PHOTOGRAPHS 44 (Dora Apel & Shawn Michelle Smith eds., 2007) (“Thousands of people were 
attracted and fascinated by the ritualized murder of the spectacle lynching. Sometimes lynchings  
were publicized in advanced by local newspapers, supported by railroads that ran special excursion 
trains to the lynching sites or added extra railroad cars to bring people from surrounding areas, and 
by schools that let out for the day, not to mention communities that attended en masse.”). 
31.  Id.   
32.  Id. at 59 (lynch victims’ “blood clothes were torn apart as  prized souvenirs”); WOOD, 
supra note 27, at 21 (“[O]ne young man brought remnants of [lynch victim’s] bone as an offering), 
and id. at 99 (“After the Jesse Washington lynching in 1916 in Waco, Texas, NAACP investigator 
Elizabeth Freeman reported that o ne white to wnsperson was carrying Washington’s  penis as a 
souvenir.”). 
33.  WOOD, supra note 27, at 3.  
34.  See id. at 1 (“Despite, or even because of, its relatively rarity, lync hing held a singular 
psychological force, generating a level of fear and horror that overwhelmed all other forms of 
violence. Even o ne lynching reve rberated, traveling with sinister force, do wn city streets and 
through rural farms, across roads and rivers.”). 
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black codes and Jim Crow laws.35  In the process,  spectacle lynchings 
revealed the extent to which the visu al and the legal don’t occupy separate 
cultural spheres but instead often share their driving impulses. 
As strange as it m ight initially seem, Wood’s painting does something 
similar.  Created by a man once described as “the most celebrated white hope 
of 100 per cent Americanism in art,”36 the painting gestures at lynching itself 
and shows us something o f the profoundly visual legal traditions that sit at 
the practice’s core.  Put differently , when it comes t o the deep connections 
that run between American art, American law, and the long history of race-
based brutality embedded in the countr y’s self-congratulatory national 




In keeping w ith the painti ng’s candor, we’d like to  begin with some 
admissions of our own.  Or at least a fe w material facts.  First, we are an art 
historian with a J.D. (Dr.  Campbell) and a law professor who te aches and 
practices law (Prof. Jewel).  We are also both white, Ivy League-educated,  
and tenured.  In ot her words, we are (among other things) two highly 
privileged academics who have chos en to write about—and therefore 
advance our careers through—a type of violence and oppression that we will 
never personally experience nor ever fully understand.  Moreover, as white 
women we belong to a group that has historically been the proximate cause 
of—or at least a convenient justification for—a stagg ering amount of race-
based atrocity in this country .37  It’s en ough to cue the stand-up comedian 
Dave Chappelle: “Come on, white woman, you know what it is. You was in 
on the heist, you just don’t like your cut.”38 
We’re not comfortable with this situ ation, nor do we think we should 
be.  To the contrary, we’ve repeatedly considered abandoning this project for 
fear of compounding the harm.  (Critics might say that here we’re sim ply 
genuflecting with a show of anxiety and moving on.  They very well might 
be right.)  Ultim ately, however, we’ve chosen to continue in this field  
because we believe we have something valuable to say.  Equipped with our 
 
35.  See id. at 98–99 (“They lynchers did literally to black men what Jim Crow effectively 
achieved in rendering them economically and politically dependent and powerless.  Cutting off his 
genitals rendered the black man a negation of white masculinity against w hich white men could 
define themselves.”).  
36.  We’ll Tell You, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 1,1940.  
37.  See Emma Coleman Jordan, Crossing the River of Blood Between Us: Lynching, Violence, 
Beauty, and the Paradox of Feminist History, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 545, 556 (2000) (“[W]hite 
women benefited from their elevated position in the racial hierarchy built on lynching.”). 
38.  Geoff Herbert, Dave Chapelle recalls ‘horrifying’ Syracuse show in new Netflix Comedy 
special, SYRACUSE.COM (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.syracuse.com/entertainment/index.ssf/2017/ 
03/dave_chappelle_netflix_comedy_special_syracuse.html.   
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collective background in law, visual history, and rhetoric, we perceive 
cultural patterns that other scholars overlook, specifically the extent to which 
the visual and the legal have long worked together to produce the world we 
inhabit.  Certainly, we do not see the w ay we would if we lived in  different 
bodies.  As this country’s perverse investment in the distinction it calls “race” 
continues to reveal just how abhorrent and tenacious it’ s always been, 
however, we do think we see in a way that’s useful—white blindness, white 




One last prefatory matter: methodology.  In our experience, it’s a word 
that’s capable of inducing panic in a fair number of law-trained academics.  
Because a J.D. is a sufficient terminal degree to become a professor at many 
law schools, num erous legal scholars do n’t have the sort  of explicit 
methodological training that most other academics receive as part of their 
Ph.D. programs.  Or at least that’s ho w the story goes.  As anyone who ’s 
survived the first year of law school can tell you: the legal process is its own 
methodology, often conf using, alienating, or just plain weird to those 
unfamiliar with its basic moves.39  At base, practitioners of the legal method 
read law texts critically and draw connections betwee n those texts and the 
larger culture.  Schooled in the hierarchy of legal knowledge, law academics 
deeply research and critically read law from primary and secondary sources.  
Through deductive and inductive reasoning, we then uncover hidden 
connections in these sources, connecting the dots to formulate synthesized 
understandings of law and culture.  A t base, we attach law (in all of it s 
nuanced permutations) to facts.  For critical legal s cholars, the “facts” are 
gleaned from a variety of sources, from majoritarian understandings of social 
norms to the social realities experienced by oppressed minorities, realities 
that are often excluded from dominant legal meanings. 
Interestingly, art historian s do som ething similar.  Like lawyers and 
legal historians, art historians tea se out meaningful links between thei r 
chosen texts and the surrounding culture, using each to illuminate the other.  
Admittedly, the art historian’s basic texts tend to differ from those studied in 
the law.  For the art historian, after all, the fundam ental primary source is 
almost always something visual: an image, object, or perform ance that, 
whether part of the “high” cultural canon (like the contents of the Louvre) or 
the product of marginalized groups ( like folk art, graffiti, etc. by the  
untrained). The academic initially submits to iconographic and form al 
questions.  In layman’s terms: what and how does a particular piece show?  
 
39.  Here, we’re writing explicitly, but not exclusively, about the American legal system with 
its roots in British common law.   
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This second, formal question—the how of showing—usually begins with an 
analysis of aesthetic elements like the work’s composition, color palette, and 
lighting.  From there, however, art hi storians frequently read thei r chosen 
images and objects more broadly, approaching them  as material 
manifestations not onl y of their creator’s skill, c onscious intent, and 
unconscious impulses but also of the la rger social and political forces that  
swirled outside of his or her studio door.  In the wonderful formulation of the 
art historian Bryan Wolf, “[w]hat is art if not a lump of history, uttered with 
precision, from the situated position of an author.”40  Or, in Grant Wood’s 
own words, “[a] painter expresses the times as well as himself.”41  In linking 
a painter’s expression to his or her times in this way, art historians turn to the 
same sorts of cultural texts that legal historians do, including diaries,  
newspaper accounts, religious sermons, estate documents, and even statutes 
and trial transcripts.  Bastardizing Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
a bit, if a particular scrap of the historical re cord tends to dem onstrate the 
existence or occurrence of a consequential fact, it’s relevant for art historical 
purposes.42 
One final word about method.  Because if law professors tend to worry 
they lack one, art historians are plagued by a different methodological angst, 
namely the specter of over-interpretation.  Here let’s be frank: our treatment 
of Grant Wood’s painting and its i mplications will almost certainly strike 
some readers as a stretch, if not an historically reckless over-read.  Scanning 
Parson Weems’ Fable, after all, one can legitimately demand, “Where’s the 
lynching?”  Moreover, Wood never di scussed the image in the context of 
race-based terrorism, nor does he appear to have been particularly  
preoccupied with the phenomenon in general.  Finally, were one to ask the  
Iowa painter whether the sustained public butchering of black Americans by 
white Americans affected what went on in his studio, he alm ost certainly 
would have said no.  Un like his fello w Regionalist artists, Tho mas Hart 
Benton and John Steuart Curry, Wood was not particularly  vocal when it 
came to the American color line, and he never made work that addressed the 
issue directly.  When it comes to concrete evidence that Wood intended 
Parson Weems’ Fable as a statement about lynching, we have nothing. 
Do we really need such dispositive proof of Wood’s artistic mens rea, 
however?  Does one actually want to confine the meaning of a painting—or 
a novel or  a song—to its creator’s demonstrable state of m ind?  The law  
 
40.  BRYAN J. WOLF, VERMEER AND THE INVENTION OF SEEING 17 (2001).  
41.  Haskell, Through The Past, Darkly, supra note 7, at 31 (quoting Arthur Millier, Could Be 
Good Farmer!: Grant Wood Denies Reputation as Glamour Boy of Painters, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
1940). 
42.  Fed. R. Evid. 401. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would b e without the eviden ce; and (b) the fact is of conse quence in 
determining the action.” 
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certainly doesn’t approach creative activity this way.  One doesn’t need to be 
overtly aware that one is borrowing fro m protected material in order to be 
guilty of co pyright infringement, for exam ple.  In Bright Tunes Music v. 
Harrisongs Music,43 a district court for the Southern District of New York 
concluded that George Harrison’s popular song “My Sweet Lord” unlawfully 
borrowed from Ronald Mack’s “He’s So Fine” despite the fact that Harrison 
did not appear to have been conscious of Mack’s specific influence on him.  
“Did Harrison deliberately use the m usic of ‘He’s So Fine’?  I do not think 
so,” the court concluded: 
 
[A]s he tried this possibility and that [in his own composition], 
there came to the surface of his mind a particular combination that 
pleased him as being one he felt would be appealing  to a 
prospective listener; in other words, that this combination of sounds 
would work.  Why?  Because his su bconscious mind knew it 
already had worked in a song his conscious mind did n ot 
remember.44 
 
As the Bright Tunes court recognized, ambient cultural influences seep 
into us witho ut our consci ous awareness and, in the cas e of artis ts, often 
reemerge unbidden in their work.  Rather than a tidy catalogue of prior art 
from which new makers affirmatively pick and choose, our common creative 
landscape exists as a sort of gravitational pull or tide—a powerfu l current 





Turning to Parson Weems’ Fable, lynching was both on and in the air 
the year Wood painted it.  “Billie Holiday, buxom blues singer at New York’s 
swank Café Society nig ht club in Sheridan Square is now heard in what is 
believed to be the first phonograp h recording in America of a popular song 
that has lynching as its theme,” the front page of Manhattan’s New York Age 
newspaper reported in June of 1939, months before Wood started work on 
the canvas.45  The song, of course, was “Strange Fruit. ”  Originally written 
as a poem by the school teacher Abel Meeropol in 193746 and first played on 
 
43.  Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
44.  Bright Tunes Music Corp., 420 F. Supp. 177 at 180. 
45.  Night Club Singer Records Song About Lynchings in the South, N.Y. AGE, June 17, 1939, 
at 1. 
46.  See Elizabeth Blair, The Strange Story of the Man Behind Strange Fruit, NPR MORNING 
EDITION (Sept. 5, 2012 3:24 AM), https://www.npr.org/2012/09/05/158933012/the-strange-story-
of-the-man-behind-strange-fruit.  
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the radio two years later,47 the work’s  haunting lament m emorialized the 
gruesome image of “[ b]lack bodies swinging in t he southern bre eze,” the 
“smell of [their] burning flesh” mixing with the “[s]cent of magnolias, sweet 
and fresh.”48  Given the song’s explicitly political subject matter, Holiday 
initially hesitated to perform  it in pub lic, even for Café Society’s liberal, 
integrated audiences.49  Moreover, Columbia Records refused to r ecord the 
track, leaving the job to Commodore R ecords, “a small left wing company 
run out of a music store on East 42nd Street.”50  Nonetheless, by July of 1939, 
“Strange Fruit” had climbed “to number 16 on the charts”51 and “was widely 
publicized” in the national press.52  Although we don’t know whether Wood 
ever heard the song, it certainly kept lynching’s “strange and bitter crop” in 
the public conversation. 
So did the type of pictures that originally inspired Meeropol’s poem.  
“Way back in the early Thirties, I saw a photograph of a lynching published 
in a magazine devoted to the exposure and elimination of racial injustice,” 
Meeropol remembered in 1971.  “It was a shocking photograph and haunted 
me for days.  As a result, I wrote ‘Strange Fruit.’”53  The image in question 
was taken by Lawrence Beitler on August 7, 1930 in Marion, Indiana and 
shows two young black men, Thomas Shipp and Abram Smith, hanging from 
a tree, their mutilated corpses thronged by a crowd of white spectators.  With 
its graphic juxtaposition of dead black flesh and live white triumph, Beitler’s 
image is often considered “ the generic lynching photograph.”54  As this 
suggests, the picture wasn’t  unique.  To the contrary, lynch mobs began 
celebrating their kills this way as early as 1889, turning the camera’s lens on 
the devastated bodies they left in their wake.55  “Hundreds of Kodaks clicked 
all morning at the scene of the lynchi ng [of Thomas Brooks in Fay ette 
County, Tennessee] . . . Picture card photographers installed a portable 
printing plant at the bridge and reaped a harvest in selling postcards showing 
 
47.  See Gene King Wires That WEVD’s Midnight Jamboree Has Been Airing that Sensational 
Anti-Lynching Song, “Strange Fruit Grows on the Trees Down South,” Ever Since the Number Was 
Released, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 10, 1939.  
48.  See Blair, supra note 46.   
49.  See David Margolick, Performance as a Force for Change: The Case of Billie Holiday 
and ‘Strange Fruit, 11 CARDOZO STUD. IN L. & LITERATURE 91, 98 (1999).  
50.  Id.   
51.  Id. at 101.   
52.  Margolick, supra note 49, at 101.   
53.  Abel Meeropol (a.k.a. Lewis Allan), Political Commentator and Social Conscience Nancy 
Kovaleff Baker, 20 AM. MUSIC 25, 45 (2002) (citing Lewis Allan, letter to Miss [Linda] Kuehl, July 
28, 1971, in the Meeropol Collection). 
54.  JAMES H. MADISON, A LYNCHING IN THE HEARTLAND 116 (2003); ASHRAF H. A. 
RUSHDY, THE END OF AMERICAN LYNCHING 61 (2012). 
55.  The Lynching of George Meadows, January 15, 1889, Pratt Mines, Alabama, reproduced 
in JAMES ALLEN, WITHOUT SANCTUARY LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN AMERICA figs. 95, 96 
(Twin Palms 10th ed. 2000).  
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a photograph of the lynched Negro,” The Crisis reported in 1915.56  Whether 
taken by snap-happy amateurs or professional photographs like Beitler, the 
act of “[m]aking a photograph became part of the ritual, helping to objectify 
and dehumanize the vic tims and, f or some, increasing the hideous 
pleasure.”57  It also produ ced an abundance of lyn ching imagery that 
Americans—particularly those in th e South—bought, displayed, and 
shared.58 
As “Strange Fruit” itsel f reveals, these picture s were inherently 
unstable, their meaning highly contingent on th e audiences who consum ed 
them.59  A picture like Beitler’s could sim ultaneously act as “a tool of t he 
mob, used to determ ine how a ly nching should be pursued, an nounced, 
remembered, and understood”60 and inspire Holiday’s chilling dirge, a song 
once described as the black South’s own “Marseillaise.”61  In keeping with 
this, lynching photographs appeared in both the white and the black press 
during the early twentieth century, visual evidence of black men’s supposed 
sexual rapacity and, in o ther publications, Euro-Americans’ capacity for 
sadism.  Admittedly, “white-owned papers in both the North and the South 
were more reluctant to” run such imagery than African American outlets like 
The Crisis and The Chicago Defender.62  In 1937 , however, Time and Life 
both ran photographs of the notorious Duck Hill, Mississippi lynching.  Had 
Wood picked up a copy of either magazine—both of which published articles 
on him and his work during the 193 0s63—he likely would have seen the  
picture of Roberts McD aniels’ dead body  chained to a tree.  One of “two 
Negroes accused of murdering a white man,” Life reported, McDaniel was 
“tortured with a blowtorch and lynched.”64 
Finally, lynching imagery made its way into the New York art scene 
during the 1930s. In 1935, two ant i-lynching art exhibitions opened in 
Manhattan, both designed “to draw public attention to the horrifying fact that 
lynching continued to be a problem”65 and to garner public support for federal 
 
56.  ALLEN, supra note 55 (quoting Opinions, Lynching, 10 THE CRISIS 71–72 (June 1915)). 
57.  Apel, supra note 30, at 16. 
58.  For descriptions of lynchings and souvenir culture, see id. at 44; Fumiko Sakashita, The 
Politics of Sexuality in Billie Holiday’s “Strange Fruit,” in GENDER AND LYNCHING: THE POLITICS 
OF MEMORY 113–114 (Evelyn M. Simien ed., 2011); WOOD, supra note 27, at 99.  
59.  Smith, supra note 27, at 15; WOOD, supra note 27, at 179–222.  
60.  Smith, supra note 27, at 14.  
61.  Margolick, supra note 49, at 101 (internal citation omitted). 
62.  WOOD, supra note 27, at 211.   
63.  See EVANS, supra note 4, at 163, 168, 176–77, 194, 238.  
64.  Life on the American Newsfront: One Lynching Spurs Congress to Stop Others, LIFE, 
April 26, 1937, at 26. 
65.  Helen Lang a, Two Antilynching Art Exhibitions: Politicized Viewpoints, Racial 
Perspectives, Gendered Constraints, 13 AM. ART 10, 11 (1999). 
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legislation on the issue—legislation that regularly made the national news.66  
Entitled “An Art Commentary  on Lynching” and “Struggle for Negro 
Rights,” the two shows included wo rk by seventy-seven artists,67 including 
well known figures like Isam u Noguchi, George Bellows, and Reginald  
Marsh.68  Although Wood famously prided himself on not belonging to the 
New York art world, livin g and working in Iowa his entire life, he had a 
gallery in Manhattan and showed there somewhat regularly.  More 
importantly, Benton and Curry each contributed work to the  NAACP-
sponsored “Art Commentary” exhibition.69  In deed, the show’s catalogue 
featured Curry’s powerful 1935 lithograph The Fugitive on its cover (fig. 2).  
By the time Wood began work on Parson Weems’ Fable, therefore, he stood 
a good chance of encountering lynching imagery—be it pictorial, written, or 
musical—in the news, on  the radio, or even in the w ork of his colleagues.  
Returning to Bright Tunes, it’s entirely possible that as Wood painted, he 
responded to the magnetic pull of pervasive influences “his conscious mind 
did not remember.”70 
 
The Lynching in the Painting 
 
Even here, however, we focus on Wood’s state of mind. What was his 
particular level of awar eness?  Further, isn’ t it possible that some of th e 
meaning contained in an image, Wood’s or otherwise, fundamentally exceeds 
its creator’s desires, conscious and unconscious?  If we accept a work of art 
as a material condensation of both an individual’s and a culture’s particular 
historical moment, must we see this image or object as having something like 
its own unconscious—a cluster of fantasies, nightm ares, and even sham es 
embedded deep in its visual structures? 
Approaching Parson Weems’ Fable in this spirit, what do we see?  What 
does the painting itself seem intent on showing us?  The cherry tree tale, of 
course, as well as the artifi cial theatricality of such nationalist story-telling, 
highlighted by the curtain , the parson,  and t he ‘jarring q uotation’ of t he 
dollar-bill Washington’s face.”71  Moving to the far left of the image, we also 
have the two slaves, engrossed in their work and seemingly unaware of the 
domestic disturbance occu rring around them.  As Wood’s biographer R. 
 
66.  See Margaret Rose Vendryes, Hanging on Their Walls: An Art Commentary on Lynching, 
the Forgotten 1935 Exhibition, in RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDIES FOR THE 
NEW CENTURY 153, 154 (Judith Jackson Fossett & Jeffrey A. Tucker, eds., 1997).  
67.  See Langa, supra note 65, at 18.   
68.  Although the two shows also included powerful work by African American artists, the 
press tended not to focus on them.  See Vendryes, supra note 66, at 162.   
69.  See Langa, supra note 65, at 13, 15; Vendryes, supra note 66, at 157, 162.  
70.  Bright Tunes Music Corp., 420 F. Supp. 177 at 180.   
71.  EVANS, supra note 4, at 271.   
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Tripp Evans observes, the canvas’s original critics didn’t seem to notice these 
figures.  Or, if they  did, they didn’t mention them in their reviews. 72  
Moreover, the pair—typically accepted as a mother and son73—don’t appear 
in Parson Wee ms’ original tale of the  cherry tree.  As such, these black 
harvesters initially seem like nothing more than pictorial garnish—a pretty 
evocation of Washington’s plantation c hildhood that the paintin g stashes 
firmly in the back of its imagined world. 
Upon closer inspection, however, one discovers that these slaves occupy 
a crucial position i n Wood’s composition.  S tationed directly beneath the 
ominous storm clouds and com pleting the im plied line that r uns from 
Weems’ pointing finger through the Washingtons’ gesturing hands, the black 
figures and their tree stand at the canvas’s vanishing point.74 The spot where 
an image’s underlying structural lines converge to create a sense of three-
dimensional space, the vanishing poin t literally anchors a picture’ s illusion 
of reality, its claim to exist as “an open window through which [ you] see”75 
rather than a flat canvas or piece of paper.  Taking advantage of this pictorial 
importance, artists since the Renaiss ance have used t he vanishing point to 
emphasize key elements in their works.  The vanishing point in Leonardo da 
Vinci’s Last Supper (1495-1498) lies directly  behind Jesus’ s head, while 
Jacques-Louis David pla ced the vani shing point in his Coronation of 
Napoleon (1807) at the crown suspended in the new emperor’s hands.  The 
fifteenth-century artists whom Wood adored often approached their 
vanishing points as a way of deepening the viewer’s understanding of a 
painting’s theme.  A s Evans discusse s in his excellent analy sis of Parson 
Weems’ Fable, Renaissance images of the Annunciation frequently embed 
their vanishing points in “tiny depictions of Adam and Eve’s expulsion from 
the Garden of Eden; thus a scene of punishment throws into relief the angel’s 
redemptive visitation to Mary.”76  Wood’s work flips this trope, juxtaposing 
the slaves’ seemingly peaceful harvest with the young Washington’s orchard 
crime.77  Evans concludes, from a purely compositional point of view, these 
slaves are “at least as important to the work’s hidden order as the figures of 
Washington and his father in the middle ground.”78 
It’s an interesting idea, this notion of the painting’s “hidden order.”  The 
art historian Wanda Corn writes of so mething similar in the catalogue that 
 
72.  EVANS, supra note 4, at 276. 
73.  Id.  
74.  Id. at 278.   
75.  LEON BATTISTA ALBERTI, ON PAINTING AND ON SCULPTURE: THE LATIN TEXTS OF DE 
PICTURA AND DE STATUA 55 (Cecil Grayson trans. & ed., 1972). 
76.  EVANS, supra note 4, at 278.   
77.  See id. at 279 (“Whereas a Renaissance artist might have placed a redemptive scene in the 
foreground, Wood follows crime with punishment.”).   
78.  Id. at 277.   
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accompanied her i mportant 1983 show of Wood’s work.  “[ E]verything 
seems all right on the surface [of the image],” Corn observes, “until we look 
closely and encounter the irrational juxtapositions and startling visual 
puns.”79  Corn refers here to the young Washington’s mask-like face, as well 
as the surfeit of gesturing  hands in the  mid- and foreground—a pictorial 
situation she aptly describes as “a kind of comedy routine, everyone pointing 
to something else.”80  Notice, however, exactly where Parson Weems points.  
Even as Augustine Washington extends his hand for the offending axe and 
George points at the weapon as if to say, “Yes, mea culpa, with the hatchet,” 
Weems subtly directs the viewers  gaze away from this central  action.  
Extending his index fing er, the reverend does no t point at either the 
Washingtons or the axe.  Instead, he ca lls our attention to the shadows they 
cast.81  As if heeding Emily Dickinson’s call to “[t]ell all the truth, but tell it 
slant,”82 the work’s painted narrator quietly  suggests that the hea rt of the  
image lies not in the  story it explicitly tells but ra ther in that t ale’s dark 
underside. 
The shadows themselves are unexpectedly unnerving.  Mentally turning 
the painting counterclockwise so that Weems’ form lies horizontal across the 
top of the c anvas, we see Augustine’ s figure red uced to a shape that 
resembles a r ound base and tall pillar, while the u mbral George exists as 
nothing more than a partial torso and pair of dangling legs.  The arc of the 
butchered tree trunk bends its own shade a short w ay beneath these blac k 
limbs and the child’s buckled shoes, evoking the sight of a headl ess figure 
suspended above a platform.  Looking at the grass beneath the protagonists’ 
feet, we seem to see a body hanged. 
Not every hanging is a lynching.  At the same time that the hangman’s 
noose evokes Holiday’s notorious poplar trees and NAACP-leader Walter 
White’s Rope and Faggot: A Biography of Judge Lynch (1929), it also speaks 
of suicide and even state-sanctione d public executions.  “Until the mid-
nineteenth century,” Amy Louise Wood writes, “condemned criminals were 
usually executed in p ublic hangings before large, often festive, crowds.” 83  
Although the Northern states transitioned to private executions before the 
Civil War,84 with the Midw est and West making the shift during the post-
bellum years, the practice persisted in the South.  “[T]he tradition of public 
execution was tenacious [in this region],” the historian Michael Trotti notes.  
 
79.  CORN, supra note 5, at 122.   
80.  Id.  
81.  My thanks to Bryan Wolf for calling this to my attention.   
82.  Emily D ickinson, Tell All the Truth But Tell It Slant, in EMILY DICKINSON, THE 
COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 506–7 (T. H. Thompson ed., 1961). 
83.  WOOD, supra note 27, at 27.  
84.  Michael A. Trotti, The Scaffold’s Revival: Race and Public Execution in the South, 45 J. 
OF SOC. HIST. 195, 201 (2011); see also WOOD, supra note 27, at 27.  
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“Even when newspaper reports called an execution ‘private,’ that meant only 
that a barrier was in some way involved in the process; it did not mean that a 
crowd was not watching t he hanging.”85  Indeed, Southerners re mained so 
attached to their spectacular demonstrations of state violence that they didn’t 
fully abandon the habit until 1936.  Three years before Wood painted Painted 
Weems’ Fable, authorities in Owensboro, Kentucky hanged twenty -seven-
year-old Rainey Bethea before a crowd of thousands.86 
Like so many of those executed in America, Bethea was black.  And like 
so many lynch victims, he had been found guilty of raping and murdering a 
white woman, albeit by a court of law rather than a vigilante posse hell-bent 
on extrajudicial self-help.  At this point, however, the line between the legal 
execution of a black man and a lynching was far from bright.  To the contrary, 
the latter was “firmly rooted in the traditional social performance of public 
executions,” with “[l]ynch mobs even appropriate[ing] many rituals of public 
execution—the declarations of guilt, the confessions, the taking of souvenirs 
and photographs—to confer legitimacy  on thei r extralegal deeds.”87  
Although the mobs pursued their “po wer to pu nish . . . with a ferocious  
vengeance that the state could not grant,”88 lynchings and public executions 
often shared a resemblance to today’s stadium shows.  Like conte mporary 
rock concerts and football games, lynchings and public executions electrified 
huge audiences with highl y theatrical displa ys of bodies and souls in 
extremis.  Unlike today’s performances, however, the lethal effe cts of the  
pyrotechnics were immediately apparent. 
Returning to Parson Weems’ Fable, we see something of this visceral, 
performative violence.  Not only  does the work’s hanging shade lie at the  
intersection of all those pointing fingers and, chillingly, the axe, the brutality 
the dark figure embeds in the painting’s soil seems to spread throughout the 
canvas.  As num erous scholars have noticed, the t one of W ood’s image 
diverges markedly from that of the original cherry tree story, which focused 
not only on “the Foundi ng Father’s precocious integrity, but also [on] 
Augustine Washington’s loving i nculcation of virtue.”89  Punishment  
certainly lurks in the background of Weems’ tale, with Augustine announcing 
early on, “Oh George!  M y son! . . . gladly would I assist to nail y ou up in 
your little coffin, and foll ow you to your grave . . . rather than see [you] a 
common liar.”90  Despite his apparent willingness to have a mendacious child 
dead, Augustine never threatens George in Weems’ account, even after h e 
discovers his ruined sapling and the identity of its assailant.  To the contrary, 
 
85.  Trotti, supra note 84, at 202.  
86.  Id. at 207.   
87.  WOOD, supra note 27, at 24.  
88.  Id.  
89.  EVANS, supra note 4, at 266.   
90.  WEEMS, supra note 4, at 12–13.  
3 - HRPLJ_16-2_JEWEL (MACROS).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2019  10:44 AM 
Summer 2019] DEATH IN THE SHADOWS 173 
the father responds to his son’s confession with joy.  “Run to my arms you 
dearest boy,” he declares, “Glad am  I, George, tha t you ever killed m y 
tree . . . Such an act of [h onest] heroism in my son, is worth more than a 
thousand trees, thou blossomed with si lver, and their fruits of pure gold.” 91  
In the original Weems’  tale, the destructiveness of young Washington’s 
actions subsides in the benevolence of the elder Washington’s paternal love. 
Not so in Wood’s painting.  As Corn observes, “[T]his is not a moment 
of forgiving, as we can tell from the storm  clouds in the sky, but of 
punishment.”92  Adding to the weather’s intimations of retribution, Augustine 
Washington looms over his son, his face ominously stern and his right hand 
seizing the broken tree in a manner that suggests its trunk might soon become 
a whip.  A close inspection of this hand reveals that Augustine’s fingers are 
drenched in red fluid—cherry juice, maybe, or perhaps blood.93  Finally, as 
Evans discusses, the combination of the slaves and the Weems’ figure invoke 
biblical notions of original sin.  Comparing the reverend’s strangely crossed 
arms to “trad itional [pictorial] allegories of Deceit” 94 and lingering on the 
reptilian quality of Weems’ green coat,95 Evans argues for the parson as “a  
snaky character who sets the scene in motion,”96 a trickster serpent who looks 
on as a woman picks red fruit.  As anyone who has read Genesis knows, it’s 
not a story that ends well. 
Crucially, Wood’s canvas repeatedly  racializes these moments of 
bloody reprisal.  The hanging black bod y, the slaves as Adam and Eve, the 
whip-like bend of the tree and its att endant suggestion of the plantation 
master’s lash, and the refrain of str ong diagonal lin es (ladder, red sleeve, 
child’s forearms, even the torqued tree trunk) that visually links the painting’s 
fantasy of happy blackness and its buried image of lynching’s black death—
again and again the painting anchors its tale of a Founding Father’s legendary 
virtue in intimations of Euro-American savagery and African-American pain.  
Created during a post-Depression, pre-war period when the country “sought 
reassurance and strength in what nove list John Dos Passos identified as 
knowledge of the ‘kind of firm ground other men, belonging to generations 
before us, have found to stand on,’”97 Parson Weems’ Fable dissolves the 
ground beneath George Washington ’s feet into a  dark conste llation of 
punishment, brutality, and even m urder.  In the  process, the painting 
 
91.  WEEMS, supra note 4, at 14.  
92.  CORN, supra note 5, at 123. 
93.  EVANS, supra note 4, at 274.  
94.  EVANS, supra note 4, at 269.  
95.  Id.  
96.  Id. at 279.  
97.  Haskell, Grant Wood: Through the Past, Darkly, supra note 7, at 13 (quoting JOHN DOS 
PASSOS, THE GROUND WE STAND ON 3 (1941)).  
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confesses to the long history  of racial  debasement that continues to lurk 
beneath the surface of America’s myths of national greatness. 
 
Law and Culture in Parson Weems’ Fable – Theoretical 
Foundations 
 
As we’ve seen, Grant Wood was “determined to rekindle national pride” 
with Parson Weems’ Fable.98  Be that as it may, he ultimately created a work 
that speaks t o the sa me racial terror memorialized in “Strange Fruit,” 
countless lynching photos, and the anti -lynching art exhibitions of 1935.  
Moreover, by embedding its shadowy figure in the ground just beneath the 
father-son duo and their legendary tree, the image plants its lynch victim in 
the soil of Washington’s childhood.  In this respect, Wood’s canvas gets it  
right.  As th e painting—although certainly n ot Wood himself—seems to 
understand, spectacle lynching’s roots lie in colonial Virginia, specifically in 
the colony’s intensely violent, deeply visual legal culture.  As discussed 
below, lynching’s hidden seeds of co lonial law and culture germ inated in 
medieval England, survived the cr oss-Atlantic voyage, and developed a  
hardy root structure in the southern colony. 
The law and the culture of colonial Virginia illum inates the meanings 
embedded in Parson Weems’ Fable.  On this point, the law-culture-law/cycle 
helps explain how legal meanings ge t produced and reproduced.  The law-
culture-law theory of legal meanings is quite simple: social norms and culture 
influence the law and vic e versa.99  Law creates the social world, but the  
social world first creates the law.100  Through a process of legitimization, the 
law converts social norms into “accepted facts.”101  The law’s power on ly 
exists if it reflects the values and norms of the people.102  One cannot change 
or transform society by decree.103  However, it is usuall y the majority voice 
that is the gage for societal values and norms; minority voices are not heard 
or valued.104  When the law strays from collectively held majoritarian norms, 
 
98.  HASKELL, supra note 7, at 30.   
99.  Elizabeth Berenguer, Disaster Unaverted: Reconciling the Desire for a Safe and Secure 
State with the Grim Realities of Stand Your Ground, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 255, 260–61 (2013) 
(citing ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 8 (2000)) [hereinafter 
Berenguer, Disaster Unaverted]. 
100.  Pierre Bourdieu , The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 814, 839 (1987) (translated by Richard Terdiman). 
101.  Id. at 817. 
102.  Berenguer, supra note 99 , at 2 62–63 (citing W INSTON P. NAGAN, CONTEXTUAL-
CONFIGURATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICIES OF HUMAN DIGNITY 82–83 
(2013). 
103.  Bourdieu, supra note 100, at 840 (internal citation omitted).  
104.  Berenguer, supra note 99, at  262 (citing W INSTON P. NAGAN, CONTEXTUAL-
CONFIGURATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICIES OF HUMAN DIGNITY 69 
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it loses its power.105  When these cultural norm s change, the law eventually 
catches up to mirror them.106 
This law-culture-law process has ne urological, psychological, and 
visual dimensions.  The recursive pro cess generates legal categories, which 
are then imbued with  a cogniti ve dimension, and eventuall y become 
entrenched in the collec tive mindset of the populace. 107  Culture constructs  
categories that become entrenched in individual and collective minds.  
Through continued use, neural pathways are forged that provide a rapid and 
unconscious path for m aking sense of the world. 108  In this way, lega l 
meanings are forged in a collectiv e awareness in unseen and unc onscious 
ways. 
We base our analy sis on a law-culture-law theory, but we also look 
beyond it. We are wrestling with  cultural norms that made their way  into 
formal law but that have now been er adicated through t he common law 
process of new cases and new statutes.  What remnants of these seeds are still 
in the American populace?109  Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio devised the 
term “somatic marker” to highlight how conceptual sti muli (words, images, 
laws) leave marks in our minds and bodies.110  Thus, a somatic marker is an 
imprint left in our bodies and minds, a reminder of a previous si gns (words 
or images) that we have seen and heard over and over again.111  Collective 
cultural experiences can produce widely shared somatic markers which affect 
our judgment and decision-making, often in an unconscious way.112  Somatic 
markers are hidden underground seeds that continue to exact influence even 
though the law and culture has changed aboveground.  Lynching was fueled 
in part by somatic markers, borne out of preexisting cultural and legal forms 
traceable to colonial and medieval legal systems.  And, these markers 
continue to thrive, a kind of cognitive virus that lives in all of us. 
The presence of somatic markers suggests that rationality is embodied, 
thriving on narrative and m etaphor, rather than  a pro duct of abstract 
reasoning separate fro m the bod y, as Descartes thought .113  Rather, “[a ] 
 
(2013)). 
105.  Id. at 262–263. 
106.  Id. at. 263. 
107.  Id. at 260–61. 
108.  Lucille A. Jewel, Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways and 
Healing Alternatives, 76 MD. L. REV. 663, 664 (2017) [hereinafter Jewel, Neurorhetoric]. 
109.  See id. at 672 (citing ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, 
AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 171 (1994)).  
110.  Id. 
111.  Id.  
112.  Id. (citing WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, NEUROPOLITICS: THINKING, CULTURE, SPEED 34–
37 (2002)). 
113.  Lucille A. Jewel, Old School Rhetoric and New School Cognitive Science: The Enduring 
Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEG. COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ALWD 39, 44–45 (2016) 
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person’s ability to reason and form ulate thoughts and concepts is ph ysical 
experiences within the world.”114  The contemplation of images (though long 
thought to be an abstract  process of high t hought) is also an em bodied 
process.115  Art history professor David Freedberg observed that people are  
“sexually aroused by  pictures and s culptures; they break pictures and 
sculptures; they m utilate them, kiss them ; cry before them. . .”116  The 
intellectual approach to art history  would class these re actions as “too  
embarrassing” and “too uncultured,” and repress the m because “they have 
psychological roots that we prefer not to acknowledge.” 117  Parson Weems’ 
Fable surfaces these shadowy connections between the legal, the visual, the 
ritualistic, and the unconscious. 
As we explain below, 118 collective socia l understandings are ofte n 
visually produced through cultural and legal iterations.  Specifically, colonial 
Virginia’s punitive legal regi me was carried out on the body  of the 
condemned and through the ey es of its  spectators.  Visual images provide 
especially fecund seeds  for the production of shared cultural meanings.  
Because visual imagery is so memorable and vivid, it’s extremely susceptible 
to mass adoption into holistic narratives.119  Visual imagery is “emotionally 
interesting, concrete, and im agery provoking . . ., proximate in a sensory,  
temporal, or spatial way.”120  Such im agery creates a “har monic effect on 
perception and retention of information that flows from stimulating the mind 
when changing input from many senses, each alternatively primary and then 
secondary, all repeating and therefore reinforcing, a co mmon message.”121  
The embodied power of visual imagery also explains how the law becomes 
intertwined with the visual to produce deep-rooted collective belief systems 
that perpetuate domination and oppression.  As described more fully below, 
a fusing of the legal and visual is particularly discernible in the way colonial 
legal codes are described public corporal punishment.122  Powerful embodied 
 
[hereinafter Jewel, Old School Rhetoric]. 
114.  Elizabeth Berenguer, Gideon’s Legacy: Taking Pedagogical Inspiration from the Briefs 
that Made History, 18 BARRY L. REV. 233 (2013) (citing AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 99, 
at 9).   
115.  See DAVID FREEDBERG, THE POWER OF IMAGES: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THEORY 
OF RESPONSE 1 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1989).  
116.  Id. 
117.  Id.  
118.  See infra notes 195-200 and surrounding text.  
119.  Lucille A. Jewel, Through a Glass Darkly: Using Brain Science and Visual Rhetoric to 
Gain a Professional Perspective on Visual Advocacy, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 237, 290 (2009) 
[hereinafter Jewel, Visual Rhetoric]. 
120.  Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the Courtroom, 49 J . OF 
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659, 659 (1985). 
121.  Sam Guiberson, Digital Media as Evidence and Evidence as Media, 19 CRIM. JUST. 57, 
58 (2004). 
122.  See infra notes 188-194 and surrounding text (di scussing the visu ality of Virginia’s  
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reactions to the visual also explains how white supre macy is perpetuated—
from white Virginia Supre me Court Judges rhapsodizing about supposedly 
visual attributes of race 123 to white rancor over the removal of confe derate 
statues in Charlottesville.124 
Because this paper grapples with how the law reproduces and reinforces 
racialized power dynamics and collective social realities, Pierre Bourdieu’s 
theories are instructive.  Bourdieu elo quently argued that legal language  
(court cases and statutes) has the power to construct reality.125  The power to 
make reality resides in the person who possesses the most juridical power, 
the power, in the words of Captain Picard, to “make it so.”126  And, this reality 
is constructed in a way that benefits those groups who are already in power.127 
In this way , law reifies majoritarian norms and tends to ignore o r silence 
minority voices.128 
Pierre Bourdieu argued that legal meanings are constructed to produce 
a robust collective mindset, or habitus.129  Everyone who operates in the legal 
“field” believes in the rules of the game  and, by virtue of playing the game, 
grows the ha bitus.130  The habitus operates like an apparatus, exerting a 
powerful form of social control to organize group relations.131  Order is 
maintained because but all the actors i nvolved buy into the complex set of  
rules, customs, and attitudes that constitute the social and cultura l 
ecosystem.132  The habitus does not create order by resorting to actual forms 
of corporal violence.133  Instead of phy sical coercion, institutional 
 
colonial laws concerning race and crime).   
123.  See Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. 134, 139 (1806) (“Nature has stampt upon the African 
and his descendants two characteristic marks, besides the difference of complexion, which often 
remain visible lo ng after the char acteristic distinction of colour either disappears o r becomes 
doubtful; a flat nose and woolly head of hair.”). 
124.  The 2017 Charlottesville white supremacist rally began as a p rotest against the city of 
Charlottesville’s plan to remove a statue of confederate general and Virginia planter Robert E. Lee.  
Bill Morlin, Bickering Galore Precedes “Unite the Right” Rally, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/08/03/bickering-galore-precedes-“unite-
right”-rally; Unite the Right Rally, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unite_the_Right_rally. 
125.  Bourdieu, supra note 100, at 827, 831.   
126.  Id. at 827.  On this point, Bourdieu is b orrowing from Speech Act Theory, a 
philosophical theory that engages with the power of words to make social meanings.  See Richard 
Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 
38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 809 (1987) (citing J. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962) and 
J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969)). 
127.  Bourdieu, supra note 100, at 817. 
128.  Berenguer, supra note 99 , at 2 62–63 (citing W INSTON P. NAGAN, CONTEXTUAL-
CONFIGURATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICIES OF HUMAN DIGNITY at 69 
(2013)). 
129.  Bourdieu, supra note 100, at 818–19, 833. 
130.  Id. at 818, 820, 831. 
131.  Id. at 818–19. 
132.  Id.  
133.  See id. at 831. 
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mechanisms and the habitus keep everyone in li ne.134  Bourdieu referred to 
this non-corporal system of social-control as “symbolic violence.”135  Unlike 
other forms of symbolic power, the law’s unique f orce derives from the 
collective buy-in of the habitus but also from the fact that the law is vested 
with the power of the sovereign state.136 
Contemporary society is indeed kept in  check through variegated and 
diffuse forms of symbolic power enervated by the habitus, which is similar 
to Foucault’s theory of discipline. 137  Analy zing this close connecti on 
between actual violence and s ymbolic violence and u nderstanding the 
embodied way that the collective hab itus developed augments Bourdieu ’s 
theories, rendering them more applicable to enduring racial striations in U.S. 
society.138  The somatic markers of racial terror, visually reproduced in the  
law and culture, have forged especi ally deep neural pathway s.  Combining 
neuroscience theory with Bourdieu’s theory, one can infer that the embodied 
process has rendered the race-law habitus uniquely robust and int ractable.  
With respect to race relations in the U.S., the law’s habitus has been forged 
from recurring nigh tmares of corporal  violence inflicted painfully on the 
body in a public manner. 
According to Bourdieu, the cycle of culture-law-culture strengthens the 
habitus and makes social relations seem normal.139  To the extent that the law 
is to be reformed or re modeled, it must be based on “pre-visions.”  Refor m 
of the law can only work if it announces what is alr eady in the process of  
being developed.140  This raises a key question: What happens when the law 
changes, but seg ments of the society  reject the pre-vi sions?  As w e show 
below, from colonial beginnings, a deeply discriminatory mindset originated 
from a religious and social culture that valued strict hierarchical order based 
on race, class, and gender.  The law was deployed to enforce that order 
through torturous corporal punishment.  This law-culture-law cycle injected 
the seeds of racial violence into the collective mindset.  After the Civil War, 
when the law diverged from its colonial foundations, certain segments of U.S. 
society rejected the pre-visions and the post-Civil War legal r eforms that 
 
134.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 82, 190–92 (Richard Nice 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977). 
135.  Id.  
136.  Bourdieu, supra note 100, at 837–38. 
137.  See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Vintage Books Edition 1979). 
138.  Bourdieu and his adherents have been criticized for elevating social  class over race as 
an explanatory factor for how social hierarchy is created.  For a thoughtful exposition on this point, 
see Audre Devine-Eller, Rethinking Bourdieu on Race: A Critical Review of Cultural Capital and 
Habitus in the Sociology of Education Qualitative Literature, May 2, 2005, available at http://aud 
reydevineeller.com/Devine-Eller,%20Rethinking%20Bourdieu,%20A%20Critical%20Review%2 
0of%20Cultural%20Capital.pdf. 
139.  Bourdieu, supra note 100, at 839. 
140.  Id. 
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abolished slavery and granted civil rights to the formerly  enslaved people. 
The citizens who particip ated in lynching clung to older (but not ancient) 
forms of law that often deploy ed injurious physical coercion to maintain 
control. 
 
Colonial Virginia as Germline 
 
Our socio-legal archeology  project, which delves into the legal and 
cultural world of colonial Virginia, uncovers artifacts of white supremacy 
and connects those artifacts to toda y’s racial wounds that refus e to heal.  
Parson Weems’ Fable is ostensibly set at George Washington’s childhood 
home in colonial Virgini a. Home to founding fathers Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, George Washington and Patrick Henry, Virginia provided 
“significant leadership” fo r the developm ent of the l egal system for what 
would eventually become the United States.141  Part of Virginia’s legacy was 
its early adoption of legalized race-based slavery, developing a robust set of 
statutes that sanctioned violence to cont rol Virginia’s slave labor force, a 
system applied in the south until the end of the Civil War.142 
The powerful white men who began cultivating Virginia’s tobacco with 
slave labor thought of themselves as heroic “cavaliers” 143 wresting the land 
from a state of nature.144  Virginia’s elite immigrants used the cavalier term  
to reference their hon or, dignity, and aristocratic support for t he Stuart 
monarchy during the English civil war.145  George Washington’s immediate 
ancestors, John Washington (paternal) and Colonel William Ball (maternal), 
were immigrants belongi ng to cavalier culture. 146  Virginia’s colonia l 
 
141.  A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 19 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980). 
142.  Id. at 39 ( The first slave control statute “would become the m odel of repression  
throughout the South for the next 180 years”). 
143.  See id. at 210–224, 397 (explaining that Virginia’s cavalier identity derived  from the 
chivalrous and aristocratic ideals held by elite royalists residing in the South and West of England). 
144.  David Wag goner, An Inquiry into White Supremacy, Sovereignty, and the Law, 45 
SOUTHWESTERN L. REV. 897, 899–900 (2016) (explaining that state of nature was a metaphor for 
both land and labor—the land was to be cultivated with harnessed labor in order to bring the land 
into civilization). 
145.  DAVID HACKETT FISHER, ALBION’S SEED, FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 207 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1989).  For a slightly more nuanced explanation of Virginia colonial planter 
culture, see BROWN, supra note 145, at 154–179.  In the context of Nathaniel Bacon’s 1676 rebellion 
against Virginia Governor William Berkeley, Professor Brown argues that Bacon and his followers 
forged an masculine identity that  relied on aristocratic ideals, but which also emphasized military  
valor, fetishized firearms, and glorified racial domination over Virginia’s indigenous people.  Id. at 
158,161, 174.  Both Berkeley’s royalist clique and Bacon’s rebellious faction considered themselves 
high-born, even if Bacon’s populist rhetoric drew in more Virginians of middle-class status.  See id. 
at 154–179.  Fisher’s Virginia cavalier thesis could perhaps be a bit more granular, but one can 
clearly see the traces of Bacon’s identity in future generations of southern culture, particularly in 
civil war/lost cause tropes.  
146.  FISHER, supra note 145, at 214. 
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aristocrats developed an ironic sense of  “liberty” that eventually  became 
inscribed in the U.S. mindset.  Th is profoundly inegalitarian concept  
encompassed the power to rule over the less powerful, but not be overruled.147 
Virginia colonist John Randolph captured the sentiment succinctly: “I am an 
aristocrat. I love liberty; I hate equality.”148 
As this suggests, colonial Virgin ia’s legal sy stem was markedly 
different from the feder alist system that e merged for states  after the  
revolution. Virginia began as a corporate business, with set tlers being 
governed as employees by executives of the Virginia company authorized by 
the king to settle Virginia.149  Moving away from the corporate governance 
model, the King of  England nonetheless kept control  of Virginia by 
appointing the governor and the counc il (both of whom reported to the 
King).150  Later, Virginians constituted an elected assembly, but its power 
was held in c heck by the council.151  From 1640-1706, all of the men who 
won a seat o n the assembly had arrived in the colony  as freeholders; “the  
rigidity of social orders was very  great.”152  Virginia c olonial law was also 
theocratic—the church and the state were not separate. 153 Moreover, 
Virginia’s Anglican religion was deeply rigid as well: “ceremonial, liturgical, 
hierarchical, and ritualist.”154 
Colonial Virginia is akin to a foreign l egal system.  Thus, to a certain 
extent, this paper looks at the legal sy stem of colonial Virginia fro m a 
comparative standpoint. Comparing legal systems is a difficult proposition, 
particularly because a co mparison of the language of two diffe rent legal 
systems (e.g., statutes and cases) does not tell the full story.155  Comparative 
law scholars reco mmend that these inquiries peer into t he culture that 
underlies and surrounds the legal system being studied, looking to the legal 
consciousness of those who are subject to a particular system’s laws.156  The 
 
147.  FISHER, supra note 145, at 411. 
148.  Id. at 412 (quoting WILLIAM CABELL BRUCE, 2 JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE 1773-
1833 203 (New York 1922)). 
149.  ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 3-4 (Univ. Chicago Press 
1930). 
150.  SCOTT, supra note 149, at 3–6. 
151.  Id. at 8–9. 
152.  FISHER, supra note 145, at 384. 
153.  See generally, WILLIAM WALLER HENNING, 1 HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 240–41, 
310 (1645) (setting o ut a process by which church wardens would notify the county courts of 
individuals who had been found to engage in punishable sins suc h as swearing, fornication, 
drunkenness, and adultery) [hereinafter Hening’s Statutes]. 
154.  FISCHER, supra note 145, at 233. 
155.  See Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 J . LEGAL STUD. 232, 234 (1996) and 
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. OF COMP. 
L. 1, 12 (1991) (both opining on  the difficulties of comparing laws because of the di fficulty in 
translating concepts). 
156.  David Nelken, Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture in COMPARATIVE LAW: 
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inquiry should also study the language of the law as well as the more implicit 
rules that the legal actors actually followed and applied.157 
This paper a lso inquires i nto the cognitive frameworks held by the 
powerful actors who forged political and social realities in colonial Virginia.  
The culture t hat underlies a foreign legal system necessarily includes a 
cognitive component.  All legal cultures contain a “[cognitive] framework of 
intangibles within which an interpretative community operates.” 158  This 
mental framework, contains “ways of organizing one’s place in the m oral 
universe through commitments to standa rds of reference and rationality .”  
This point, from comparative law scholars Roger Cotterell an d Pierre 
Legrand, aligns directly with Bourdieu’s habitus concept, the idea that social 
control results from  a com plex process engaging people, institutions, and 
psychological mindsets.159 
The mindset of colonial Virginians was a product of both law and  
culture.  And through the culture-law-c ulture cycle, this anti-humanistic 
mindset became deeply embedded in its constituents.  For generations, this 
mindset has been reinforced and reproduced, influencing U.S. culture to this 
day.  On the issue of cultural influe nce, one can glean immense value fro m 
David Hackett Fisher’s Albion’s Seed, a historical masterwork that traces the 
influence of British folkway s on the colonies. 160  Fis her’s thesis i s that 
regional American cultures can be traced back to specific regions in England. 
Fisher traces Virginia’s colonial culture  to the society  that existed in the  
Southern and Western parts of England.161  Thus, Fisher’s study of colonial 
Virginia brightly illuminates the cultu ral practices and belief sy stems that 
came to deeply influence the culture of the American South.162  Fisher notes 
that England and Colonial Virginia were both “marked by deep and pervasive 
inequalities, by a staple agriculture and rural settlement patterns, by powerful 
oligarchies of large landowners . . .”163  Notably, the southern part of England 
(which is where most Virginia colonists hailed from ) practiced slavery 
extensively in the eighth and ninth centuries, so much that medieval English 
slaveholdings reached levels comparable to those in the American South.164  
The dialect of Colonial Virginia (which eventually  morphed into Southern 
American speech patterns) also mirrored speech patterns of  Southern 
 
A HANDBOOK 111–112 (Esin Orucu and David Nelken eds. Hart Publishing 2007). 
157.  Sacco, supra note 155, at 27.   
158.  Roger Cotterell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 721 (Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006) (quoting PIERRE 
LEGRAND, FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE 19, 27 (Tjeenk Willink 1999)). 
159.  See supra, notes 129–140 and surrounding text. 
160.  FISHER, supra note 145. 
161.  FISCHER, supra note 145, at 208. 
162.  Id. at 207–418. 
163.  Id. at 246.  
164.  Id. at 243. 
3 - HRPLJ_16-2_JEWEL (MACROS).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2019  10:44 AM 
182 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
England, sharing words like howd y, grit, moonshine, yonder, taters, and  
holler.165 
 
Whips and Pillories 
 
At the sa me time that col onial Virginia maintained the Motherland’s  
general investment in ine quality, particularly in sla very, it preserved the 
English taste for corporal punishment.  Beginning in the fourteenth century, 
British lawmakers had turned to the older Norman practice of  maiming 
criminals in order to protect its rigid feudal labor sy stem.166  Three hundred 
years later, British colonists would import such physical chastisements to the 
New World,167 flogging, hanging, and fatally burning an assortment of  
wrongdoers during Virginia’s first years alone.168  Dale’ s Laws, a set of 
notoriously severe legal codes publish ed between 1611 an d 1619, gives a 
sense of early disciplinary measures in the colony—perhaps most notably in 
its mandate that bakers who overcharg ed for bread have their ears sliced  
off.169  (The laws prescribed the sam e treatment for cooks who stole fro m 
their masters’ kitchens.170)  Under the direction of Dale’s Laws, co lonists 
dealt with a man found guilty of stealing three pi nts of oatmeal from the 
public store by shoving a bodkin through his tongue and tying him to a tree 
to die of starvation.171 
Although Virginia repealed Dale’s Law in 1619,172 the community went 
on to prom ulgate new measures that, if slight less draconian, were still 
viciously corporal.  In addition to ear-cutting and t ongue-boring, colonial 
statutes and decrees teem with references to gauntlet-running, branding, and, 
most commonly, whipping.173  “[T ]he simplest, least costly, and m ost 
 
165.  FISHER, supra note 145, at 257–261. 
166.  KELLY ROBERTSON, THE LABORER’S TWO BODIES 2, 14, 16, 20, 33 (Palgrave 2006).  
As Prever discusses, feudal workers who refused to comply with Britain’s stringent labor laws could 
expect to be placed in the stocks or, in extreme cases, be branded on the forehead with the letter F 
for false or “fauxine.”  Id. at 16.  
167.  As in most of  the colonies, corporal punishment was the go-to method for maintaining 
control over the populace. Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview, 
256 AMERICAN J. OF LEGAL HIST. 328–29 (1982). 
168.  Robertson, supra note 166, at 16.   
169.  On the law’s harsh cruelty, see  SCOTT, supra note 149, at 8–9, 141; David Thomas 
Konig, “Dale’s Laws” and the Non-Common Law Origins of Criminal Justice in Virginia, 26 J. OF 
AM. LEGAL HIST. 354, 354 (1982). On separating bakers and cooks from their ears, see SCOTT, 
supra note 149, at 8–9. 
170.  SCOTT, supra note 149, at 141. 
171.  Id. at 142. 
172.  Id. at 8–9, 141. 
173.  See SCOTT, supra 149, at 150 (acting against one ’s commanding o fficer to garner a 
penalty of having one’s sword broken and ears cut off, unless one can pay a 100 pound fine; man 
who spoke out against the governor received an awl through his tongue and then subjected to the 
gauntlet); 1 Hening’s Statutes 254–55 (1642-43) (runaway servants branded with the letter R on the 
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immediate form of punishment,”174 whipping—or “lashes” and “stripes” as  
it was commonly called—was applied to  a wide variety  of i nfractions, 
including drunkenness and cursing; 175 fornication and a dultery;176 incest;177 
manipulating the tobacco market by cutting plants;178 and disobeying the 
lawful commands of a sea captain.179 
As one might expect, the nature and severity of an offender’s sentence 
often depended on the person’s place in Virginia’s rigid social hierarchy, with 
women, low-status workers, and people of color receiving harsher penalties 
than the colony’s upper-class white men.  Such disparities st emmed in part 
from the former groups’ inability to pay the fines that were sometimes offered 
as an alternative to phy sical mortification.180  Under  one 1696 statute, fo r 
example, a person found guilty of drunkenness had the option of paying a 
fine of either 10 shillings or 100 pounds of tobacco or, alternately, lying in 
the stocks for two hours. 181  The same statute set the penalty for fornication 
and adultery at 500 shillings, 1000 pounds of tobacco, “twenty -five lashes 
well laid on,” or two months in prison.182  A later law would formalize this 
money-or-suffering calculus, explic itly equating every 50 0 pounds of 
tobacco levied for a violation to twenty  lashes.183  Because women, 
indentured servants, and e nslaved persons generally lacked the f inancial 
resources to satisfy such statutes, they  depended on their husbands, 
employers, and owners to pa y for their transgress ions.  If such parties 
declined, vulnerable convicts had no choice but to discharge their sentences 
in the currency of pain.184 
Adding to such profo undly unequal protections of the law, certain 
Virginia codes dictated different sentences depending on a wrongdoer ’s 
class, gender, or race.  Whereas free men convicted of trading with 
indigenous people were sentenced to a month of labor, servants and enslaved 
people found guilty of the same offense received 20 stripes. 185  In a si milar 
vein, men weren’t subjected to the ducking stool.  In order to find yourself 
publicly strapped to a chair and plunged into a pond in colonial Virginia, you 
needed to be a woman—generally an unruly woman who couldn’t control her 
 
face in 1630); Preyer, supra note 167, at 348.   
174.  Preyer, supra note 167, at 348.   
175.  3 Hening’s Statutes 153 (1699). 
176.  3 Hening’s Statutes 139 (1696). 
177.  3 Hening’s Statutes 246 (1730). 
178.  1 Hening’s Statutes 164 (1631). 
179.  4 Hening’s Statutes 107 (1722). 
180.  SCOTT, supra note 149, at 239–251. 
181.  3 Hening’s Statutes 139 (1696). 
182.  Id. 
183.  3 Hening’s Statutes 452 (1705). 
184.  See id.  
185.  1 Hening’s Statutes 167 (1631). 
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gossipy tongue.186  Finally, colonial laws frequently subjected people of color 
to more extensive physical punishment than their white counterparts.  One 
statute from 1699 mandated 25 stripes for white  hog thieves but 39 (the 
maximum allowed by the Bible)187 for those who were black.188  In this case, 
the extra 14 lashes attached regardless of whether the offender was slave or 
free.  In other instances, the colonial legal system reserved the full 39 blows 
for slaves alone, including those who ran away,189 forged false certificates of 
freedom,190 or possessed guns or other weapons.191  As savage a s these 
whippings undoubtedly were, they paled in comparison to slave punishments 
dictated by other statutes, at least two of which expressly  authorized the 
courts to have runaways dismembered.192 
According to one such law, dismembering enslaved people who tried to 
escape would “terrify [y] others from like practices . . . .”193  This suggests 
that the sentence was to be carried out publicly.  Even if recaptured runaways 
weren’t to be ripped apart in front of an actual crowd, colonial legislators at 
least envisioned a situati on in which accounts of t he physical desecration 
would make their way back to the slave populatio n, deterring others fro m 
trying for freedom by packing their minds full of horrifying images of bodies 
disjointed and torn.  Indeed, the trinity of escape, apprehension, and 
mutilation didn’t even have to occur for such terrible mental pictures to take 
shape.  As mandated by law, statutes of particular importance—including the 
slave codes that authorized extreme whipping and dismemberment for 
 
186.  BROWN, supra note 145, at 147-148. 
187.  Deuteronomy 25:3 (King James Version) (“Forty stripes he may give him, and not 
exceed: lest, if he should exceed, and beat him above these with many stripes, then t hy brother 
should seem vile unto thee.”).  In Talmudic law, the number was reduced to 39 to avoid exceeding 
40 even by mistake.  See Flogging, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, https://www.jewishvirtual 
library.org/flogging. 
188.  3 Hening’s Statutes 179 (1699).  Unsurprisingly, white thieves were also allowed to pay 
a tobacco fine—an option not available to their black counterparts.  See id.  Moreover, in case of a 
second offense, black hog thieves were to have their ears nailed to the pillory and then cut off—a 
particularly gruesome punishment that the courts also inflicted on people of color who gave false 
testimony.  3 Hening’s Statutes 179 (1699); 4 Hening’s Statutes 127–128 (1723).  Admittedly, white 
Virginians sometimes received this sentence, as well; ear-cutting was fairly common throughout the 
colonies and in England.  See HUGH F. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE GENERAL 
COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 196 (Univ. of Virginia Press 1 965) (at British common law, a  
conviction of forgery came with the penalty of having one’s ears cut off); SCOTT, supra note 149, 
at 8–9, 141 (Bakers could lose an ear for overcharging for bread).  
189.  Id. at 456–57  (This particular statute author ized “as many lashes as appropriate no t 
exceeding the number of thirty-nine.”). 
190.  3 Hening’s Statutes 455 (1705). 
191.  4 Hening’s Statutes 131 (1723). 
192.  See 3 Hening’s Statutes 460– 61 (1705) (Despite the fa ct that d ismembering was 
explicitly authorized, there is not  much historic evidence of this being carried out.) SCOTT, supra 
note 149149, at 301 (This could be an example of Damocles’ sword hanging by a thread, but not 
cutting); 4 Henning’s Statutes 132–33 (1723). 
193.  3 Hening’s Statutes 460–61 (1705). 
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runaways—were to be po sted on chur ch doors and  read aloud “after the 
sermon/divine service is ended.”194  In Virginia, even blindness and illiteracy 
could not save you from violent penal imagery. 
As this reveals, he coloni al legal system revolved around som ething 
more than the blunt inflict ion of pain or even death.  At the sa me time that 
Virginia’s laws and judicial decrees relied on the threat of physical suffering 
to keep the community in line, it used the sight—real or imagined—of such 
agony as a disciplinary tool.  In keeping with this attention to the visual, the 
colony ordered convicts whipped in public195 and frequently exhibited the 
bodies of the enslaved an d other marginalized people it executed.  After 
beheading and quartering the enslaved Scipio and indigenous Salvadore for 
planning a rebellion in 1710, the colony ordered pieces of their bodies strung 
up in four different counties for ad terrorem effect196; having dealt with the 
remains of t wo Goochland Count y slaves executed  for treason in 1733, a 
local sheriff requested reimbursement for the supplies and labor involved in 
“carrying and setting up the heads and quarters of the two at the places 
mentioned by order of the Court.”197  In these cases and others like them, the 
juridical apparatus amplified its power by transforming those it classified as 
wrongdoers into extravagant displays. 
The shaming punishments so preval ent in the colony  worked in a 
similarly visual fashion.198  By law, every county in Virginia was required to 
maintain a pillory, a set of stocks, and a ducking stool.199  Although each of 
these devices acted on its victims’ bodies, it also mortified their souls by 
holding them open to the community’s scrutiny and scorn.  Subjected to the 
ducking stool, for example, a woman not only had to endure the physical 
torture of repeated near-dr owning, she also had to withstand the crushing 
 
194.  3 Hening’s Statutes 460 (1705). 
195.  See, e.g., 3 Hening’s Statutes 278 (1705)  (punishment administered at the common 
whipping post for hog stealing); 4  Hening’s Statutes 174 (1726) (punishment administered at the 
public whipping post for counterfeiting a servant or  slave’s travel pass); 4 Hening’s St atutes 213–
14 (1727) (punishment administered at the public whipping for women convicted for bastardy). 
196.  4 Hening’s Statutes 174 (1726); 4 Hening’s Statutes 213–14 (1727). 
197.  RANKIN, supra note 188, at 225 (internal citation to contemporaneous newspaper reports 
omitted).  In 1739, a slave was convicted of burning the owner’s manor house.  The court ordered 
that the slave be hanged, that his head be cut off and displayed on a pole in a public place.  Id. at 
133 (citing York County Records, Wills, Deeds and Orders 489 (1728-1732), Virginia State Library 
Richmond Virginia; York County Records, Wills, Deeds and Orders 419–420 (1768-1770), Virginia 
State Library Richmond Virginia; T.C. CAMPBELL, A HISTORY OF CAROLINE COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
337 (Richmond 1956).  In  1767, four slaves  were hanged and their heads were placed on the 
chimney at the Alexandria Virginia courthouse.  RANKIN, supra note 188, at 225 (internal citation 
to contemporaneous newspaper reports omitted). 
198.  Clearly, one c an’t draw a sharp  distinction between punishments that were strictly  
corporal and those that were purely shame based.  Instead, the  majority of  the colony’s legal  
sanctions relied on a mixture of both.   
199.  2 Hening’s Statutes 75 (1661). 
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humiliation of being publi cly exhibited as a reprobate.  Si milarly, a man 
confined to the pillory (head and hands) or stocks (feet) might be physically 
assaulted by the crowd that gathered around him .  Even if his neighbors 
refrained from such abuse, however, he still had to weather the social horror 
of being labeled an offender in such graphic fashion. 200  Although t he law 
obviously tempered the full force of its violence when it employed strategies 
of painful humiliation rather than outright execution, a tremendous amount 
of brutality still sprang from its power to turn the guilty into public symbols 
of transgression.  As with its displays of mutilated bodies and decapitated  
heads, the legal system demanded obedience from all by visualizing itself on 
the condemned in extremely visceral ways. 
This impulse to corporealize likely stemmed in part from  Virginia’s 
theocratic nature.  As m entioned above, the colony m aintained no sharp 
distinction between secular government and what it s aw as God’s dictates.  
Not only did certain legal punishm ents derive directly  from the Old  
Testament,201 church attendance was mandatory, and ministers were required 
by statute t o preach in t he morning and catechize in t he afternoon.202  
Moreover, the community charged church wardens with policing crimes like 
blasphemy, swearing, and drunkenness,  as well as sending the violators to 
the county court to be punished.203  Unsurprisingly, Sabbath-breaking in this 
culture exposed one to legal punishment, as did boating, shooting a gun, or 
travelling unnecessarily on a Sunday.204  (Luckily for such miscreants, arrests 
couldn’t be executed on Sundays either.205)  As previously noted, certain laws 
were also posted and read aloud at church.206  In this strict Christia n 
environment, the Bible animated near ly every aspect of daily  life, and 
everyone in power would have known their scripture, including John 1:14’s 
pronouncement that “the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us . . . .”207  
As if mirroring God’s decision to incarna te his sacred text in the form of 
Jesus Christ, Virginia repeatedly incised its legal codes into the flesh of the 
 
200.  Even here, Virginia law seems to  have reserved the cruelest penalties for non- whites.  
To the extent that colonial statutes law  explicitly prohibited whipping a “white Christian servant” 
naked, we can infer that it was acceptable—and likely common—to whip persons of c olor naked, 
thereby intensifying the  punishment’s mixture of p hysical and emotional pain.  See 3 Hening’s 
Statutes 449–450 (1705). 
201.  As discussed above, whipping had biblical precedent.  See supra note 187.  Moreover, 
at least one court  sentenced a man to d eath based on a passage from Leviticus.   OLIVER PERRY 
CHITWOOD, JUSTICE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 1 (John Hopkins Press 1905).   
202.  FISHER, supra note 145, at 234; 1 Hening’s Statutes 385 (1657). 
203.  1 Hening’s Statues 310 (1645). 
204.  1 Hening’s Statutes 457 (1657). 
205.  Id. 
206.  See supra note 194.   
207.  John 1:14 (King James Version).  
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convicted, ensuring that t he colony’s juridical mandates lived am ong its 
inhabitants in extremely literal, visible ways.208 
Here again we see that punishment was not sim ply a matter of injury 
and deterrence in Virginia.  Instead, penalties like dismem bering, ducking, 
and public whipping served to render the community legible; they worked to 
contain disruptive members of the populace by visually putting them in their 
place.209  In this context, it should come as no surprise that the law sometimes 
mandated actual branding, ordering an “R” seared into the cheeks of runaway 
servants, for example.210  Like the whip scars, missing ears, pierced tongues, 
and burned hands211 the colonial legal sy stem created, this single  letter 
ensured that even after the culprits’ corporal pain ended, their social suffering 
and, just as important, social utility would continue as those around them read 
their bodies as an alphab et of sin. 212  Im plementing the sort of “puniti ve 
semiotics” that the literary historian Kellie Robertson discusses in the context 
of medieval England,213 Virginia’s legal system compelled intransigent—or 
often simply defenseless—members of the colony to literally embody its 





According to the Anglican “Ho mily of Obedience,” God keeps a tidy 
house.  “Almighty God has created and appointed all things in heaven, earth 
and water, in a most excellent and perfect order,” the sermon teaches: 
 
In heaven he hath appointed distinct and several orders and  
states of arc h-angels and angels . In e arth he hath assigned and  
appointed kings, princes, and other governors under them, all in 
good and necessary order . . . The sun, m oon, stars, rainbows, 
 
208.  Cf. Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 494 
(1997).  (“The racial contours of the legislatively color-lined bodies stand out from the statute books 
like lovingly carved temple dancers. Bodies are typed and arranged in every possible permutation.”). 
209.  See also 1 Hening’s Statutes 517 (1658-59) (required that the hair of runaway servants 
be cut off, “so that they can be better apprehended.”) 
210.  1 Hening’s Statutes 255 (1642-43).  
211.  During the col onial era, be nefit of the clergy was a legal fiction (although it had  
ecclesiastical roots) that allowed defendants to obtain clemency.  RANKIN, supra note 188, at 105–
107.  In order to receive the benefit of the clergy, which could only be offered once, the recipient 
agreed to have his or her  hand burned in open court.  4 Hening’s Statutes 325–26 (1732).  By 
effectively branding certain individuals with fire, the community ensured that no one would receive 
the benefit of the clergy twice.  At the same time, the practice overtly marked those who took the 
benefit as wrongdoers, thereby reminding them (and anyone who saw their scarred hands) of their 
status as transgressors. 
212.  The colony insisted on this sort of hyper-visibility outside the legal context as well.   
213.  ROBERTSON, supra note 166, 16.  
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thunder, lightning, clouds and all the birds in the air do keep their 
order.  The earth, trees, se eds, plants, herbs, corn, grass, and all  
manner of beasts keep themselve s in order . . . . And man himself 
hath all his parts . . . members of his body in a profitable, necessary 
and pleasant order.  Every degree of people in their vocations, 
calling and office, hath ap pointed to t hem their dut y and order. 
Some are in high degree; some in low, and every one have need of 
the other.214 
 
Sitting in church, colonia l Virginians likely would have heard this 
tribute to God’s proclivity for arranging and sorting; they likely would have 
absorbed the homily’s vision of the divine necessity of separation and 
hierarchy in all things, especially the social framework, be it of angels or of 
men.215  Stepping outside the church’s door, those with power the n set to 
work molding the colony into a reflection of such sacred categories, relying 
in no sm all measure on codes and judicial decree s that distinguished the 
dutiful from the wayward by marking the latter with visible signs of their 
(dis)order. 
Here lies the fundamental similarity that links colonial Virginia’s legal 
regime and t he race-based l ynchings that ripped through nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century America.  It’s not only that white mobs staged lynchings 
as quasi-religious rites, invoki ng evangelical traditions, hol y relics, and 
powerful Christian imagery to “re-creat[e] divine judgment on earth”216 in 
ways that echo the colony’s overt merger of disciplinary violence and sacred 
ritual.217  Nor is it the fact that both the c olony and the ly nch mob policed 
their respective populations through horrifying acts of torture, mutilation, and 
dismemberment—acts that concentrated either disproporti onately or 
exclusively on people of color.  Instead, it’s the extent to which s uch acts 
sought to stabilize colonial Virginia and post-Civil War America by savagely 
displaying those who threatened the status quo.  Whether dealing wit h 
eighteenth-century enslaved people wh o jeopardized the colon y’s property 
regime through their attem pts at escape or post-bellum African-Americans 
who disturbed the racial hierarchy by asserting their rights (or even just their 
existence), colonial court s and lynch mobs seized such offenders and tore  
them—sometimes literally, sometimes figuratively—into images.218  
 
214.  FISCHER, supra note 145, at 398 (quoting An Exhortation to Obedience, in BOOK OF 
HOMILIES (1562)). 
215.  In the Anglican religion, the opposite of order is the sinful concept of “commingling” or 
“confusion.” FISCHER, supra note 145, at 398. 
216.  WOOD, supra note 27, at 65. 
217.  For lynchings as religious rituals, see WOOD, supra note 27, at 60–65. 
218.  See id. at 76 (“The lynching victim was in this way himself a representation—a signifier 
of black inferiority and depravity and, in turn, of white female power and supremacy.”).   
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Reducing their victims to a ghastly mass of garbled flesh, British Virginians 
and lynch mobs alike rooted the “profitable, necessary and pleasant order”219 
of their respective worlds in exhibiti ons of black disorder;220 they ensured 
the integrity of the white body  politic by ravaging the bodies of those who 
dissented, even if that dissent was nothing more than the color of their skin.  
Whether such strategies of discipline ste mmed from legal codes and 
decisions or instead violated the law as i t was written seems less important 
here than the  shared reliance on a part icular kind of theatrical visuality , a 
particular type of corporal symbolism.  Turning their violent attentions to the 
“turbulent traitor[s]”221 who stood before them, the colonial legal system and 
white lynch mobs didn’t simply make these transgressors suffer.  Instead,  




According to the legal scholar Anthony Farley, such vicious imposition 
of meaning is nothing less than race itself.  As Farley discusses in his seminal 
article “The Black Body as Fetish Object,” “white” and “black” aren’t neutral 
descriptive terms but rather ele ments of “a sadomasochisti c form of 
pleasure”222 in which people who identif y as white project their collective  
knowledges, needs, fantasies, and f ears onto peopl e they characterize as 
black.223  In addition to physically assaulting African-Americans, Farley 
argues, Euro-Americans thrill to the power they flex by battering them 
semotically—by forcing people of color to bear certain stories, by insisting 
 
219.  FISCHER, supra note 145, at 398 (quoting An Exhortation to Obedience, in BOOK OF 
HOMILIES (1562)).   
220.  Cf. WOOD, supra note 27, at 8 (“[lynching] rituals enacted and embodied the core beliefs 
of white supremacist ideology, creating public displays of bestial black men in visible contrast to  
strong and c ommanding white men.  Lynching allowed southerners to perform and attach 
themselves to these beliefs—to literally inhabit them.”).  
221.  Unlike the mod ern conception of treason, the  crime was defined more broadly during 
the colonial period to include instances where a social inferior killed a superior, such as the killing 
of a father by a son, a husband by a wife, or a master by a servant or slave.  RANKIN, supra note 
188, 223–234; FISHER, supra note 145, at 280.  Rebellion and insurrection were also included in the 
crime of treason.  SCOTT, supra note 149, at 154; RANKIN, supra note 188, at 223–224.  If a slave 
crossed the color line to strike out against his/her master, that constituted treason.  This conception 
of treason explains why , in the se minal case State v. Mann, Judge Ruffin referred to the tension 
between masters and their “turbulent traitor” slaves.  State v. Mann, 2 Dev. 263, 267 (1829).  It also 
suggests that lynch mobs punished their black victims for perceived acts of treason, whether they 
defined such so-called violations of the social order as such or not.   
222.  Farley, supra note 208, at 461.  
223.  Id. (“I describe ‘race’ as a sadomasochistic form of pleasure.  I employ an existentialist 
definition of sadomasochism throughout: ‘The existentialist definition of ‘sadism’ briefly is this.  It 
is the process by which one man tries to transform another into a m ere object of his will.  The 
masochist is delighted by the spectacle of himself as the object of another’s will.  The two attitudes 
are, of course, linked.”). 
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that they stand for this fact or demonstrate that truth.  Seen this  way, race 
isn’t a natural category but rather a crime of non-consensual signification.224  
Labelling other human beings as “black,” whites effectively slice them  into 
the flags of racial se maphore.225  Although the m arks this dissection leaves 
aren’t as overtly bloody as those found in the colonial magistrate’s severed 
heads or the lynch mob’s mutilated bodies, they, too, solidify white power by 
forcibly converting people of color into  the register of metaphor.  Like the  
magistrates and mobs who came before, contemporary whiteness continues 
to command obedience to its “good and necessary order”226 by transforming 
those it christens “Other” into symbols that it then circulates and displays.227 
As Farley demonstrates, this racial meaning-making takes place in two 
stages, with whites first defining blackness and then repudiating any 
involvement in such aggressive projectio ns.  In Farley’s words, “[r]ace is a 
form of pleasure in one’s body which is achieved through humiliation of the 
Other and, then, as the las t step, through a denial of the entire process.”228  
Such denials have taken  numerous forms over centuries, including  the 
colonial fiction that enslaved black people weren’ t full, rational humans;229 
pseudoscientific theories that African  Americans belonged to a  different 
species than Euro-Americans;230 and contemporary arguments that the U.S. 
is a colorblind society, with race playing no role in the continuing disparities 
and deprivations suffered b y people of color.231  Thro ugh it all, h owever, 
“[t]he pleasure of whiteness [has been] achieved through the degradation of 
 
224.  For this reason, Farley compares race to rape.  As he argues, “The rapist seeks to impose 
his meanings on her body . . . .  The rapist experiences the same pleasure during the struggle over 
the rapist as in the struggle over the meaning of the rape, for in both cases he struggles to impose 
his theme [meaning] upon his victim’s body.”   Id. at 472.  Like the rapist, whites derive deep 
satisfaction from forcing their black targets to embody particular meanings, to take white definitions 
of blackness into themselves in a way that violates the basic boundaries of the self.   
225.  As Farley  writes, “[t]o be the matized as black  is a form of humiliation in and of 
itself . . . .  There can be no such thing as good race relations for it is the category of race itself 
which constitutes the humiliation.  Blackness is the yellow star, the pink triangle, the scarlet letter, 
and the bad reputation.  To be black is to occupy the role of inferior-for-whites, specifically, to be 
black is to be available for racial humiliation.”  Id. at 473–74. 
226.  FISCHER, supra note 145, at 398 (quoting An Exhortation to Obedience, in BOOK OF 
HOMILIES (1562)). 
227.  See Farley, supra note 208, at 463 (“The satisfaction of this will-to-whiteness is form of 
pleasure in an d about one’s body.  It is a pleasure which is satisfied through the  production, 
circulation, and consumption of images of the not-white.”).  
228.  Id. at 464.  
229.  Id. at 470; see also Waggoner, supra note 144, at 89 9–904 (explaining that  
Enlightenment philosophers believed that non-European people of color did not have the capacity 
to reason or participate in civilization).  
230.  This pseudo-scientific theory was called “polygenesis” and was most famo usly 
advocated by the Swiss biologist Louis Agassiz.  For more on Agassiz and polygenesis, see inter 
alia, STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 74–81 (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, rev. ed. 1996). 
231.  Farley, supra note 208, at 469, 525–26. 
3 - HRPLJ_16-2_JEWEL (MACROS).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2019  10:44 AM 
Summer 2019] DEATH IN THE SHADOWS 191 
black bodies and a mask ing of t he means by  which that degr adation is 
achieved.”232  The gratifications of whiteness, in other words, depends on the 
double-action of story -telling and disavowal.  Within this sy stem, it’s not  
enough to impose one’s meanings on anot her’s body.  To trul y savor the 
satisfactions of race, whiteness must instead camouflage “the social as the  
natural”233 by shoving its identity as the author of its racial mythologies far 
below the surface.234 
Much as Parson Weems’ Fable forces its hanging black figure beneath 
the surface of its patriotic tale.  Returning to Grant Wood’s painting one last 
time, the work’s “effort to preserve and celebrate the art of fable making itself 
as a part of t he American national identity”235 now reads very differently.  
“[An] image of a clever author m aking up a story about not telling lies,” 236 
the canvas presents us with a diagram of race as a visuo-legal fiction in this 
country: its origins in co lonial Virginia’s deeply visual legal regime, its 
murderous reification in postbellum  America’s theater of lynching, its  
persistence as the country’s ur- (or maybe unter-) narrative—the story  of 
black abjection that gives rise, as  it does formally in Wood’s picture, to the 
rest of our fables, the rest of our icons and symbols and tales. Seen this way, 
the figure of Parson Wee ms doesn’t simply pull the curtain on the violence  
of American nationalism.  Instead it personifies the reptile br ain of the  
country’s legal sy stem and its lo ngstanding demand—allegorized so 
forcefully in Weems’ po inting figure—that we lo ok.  “[ A] ghost story 
wrapped in the comforting illusion of a patrio tic subject,” in Evans ’ 
wonderful words,237 Parson Weems Fable confronts us with the strange fruits 











232.  FARLEY, supra note 208, at 502.  
233.  Id. at 475.   
234.  See id. (“Race is not a matter of ‘difference’; it is a matter of power . . . .  The ideology 
of ‘difference’ functions as deni al in our culture by masking, on  the ground of nature, the 
sadomasochistic relationship between whites and blacks.  The discourse of ‘racial difference’ is not 
solely a way of representing the social as the natural, it is also a pleasure-in-itself.”). 
235.  CÉCILE WHITING, ANTIFASCISM IN AMERICAN ART (Yale Univ. Press, 1989), 104.  
236.  Thistlewaite, supra note 13.   
237.  EVANS, supra note 4, 280.   
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